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Abstract. The extended Feistel networks are dened elsewhere. Here we
analyse the prop ratio tables of the extended Feistel networks and of the
quasigroups produced by them. Since the prop ratio tables are used in dier-
ential cryptanalysis, the obtained results can be useful in designing suitable
cryptographic primitives, when extended Feistel networks and quasigroups
produced by them are used. One new classication of quasigroups, according
to their prop ratio table properties, is given as well.
1. Introduction
Extended Feistel networks (EFNs) are introduced in [5] as one generalization
of the Feistel networks, introduced by H. Feistel [4]. The name was unhappily
chosen, because it has been already used by several authors for denoting the type-
1, type-2 and type-3 Feistel networks (introduced by Zheng et al [9]). Here we use
the meaning of the EFNs as it is dened in [5].
In this paper we give further analysis of the EFNs and of the quasigroups
produced by them, and especially we consider the so called prop ratio tables.
The prop ratio tables, introduced by Daemen [3], can be used in analyzing the
resistance of some cryptographic primitives again dierential cryptanalysis.
Dierential cryptanalysis, introduced by E. Biham and A. Shamir [1], is a chosen
plaintext attack/chosen ciphertext attack, because the attacker is able to choose
pairs of plaintexts such that there is a specied dierence X between members
of the pair. For any particular cipher, the plaintext pair dierence must be care-
fully chosen, if the attack has to be successful. The attacker then trace a path
of highly probable dierence through all rounds of the cipher until the dierence
of the corresponding ciphertext pairs Y , termed a dierential characteristic, has
suitable value. The resulting pair of dierences (X;Y ) is called a dierential.
In an ideally randomized cipher, the probability that a particular output dier-
ence Y occurs, given a particular input dierence X, is 2 n, where n is the
number of input bits. Statistics of the dierentials can discover where the cipher
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exhibits non-random behaviour resulting with recovering of the secret key. Statis-
tical properties of dierentials depend upon the nature of non-linear components
of the cryptographic primitive, usually S-boxes, so they must be examined.
Let a and a be n-dimensional binary vectors with bitwise dierence aa = a0.
Let b = h(a); b = h(a) and b0 = b  b. Hence, the dierence a0 propagates to
the dierence b0 through the mapping h and this dierence propagation is denoted
by (a0 a h ` b0). The prop ratio Rp of a dierence propagation (a0 a h ` b0) is
dened by
Rp(a
0 a h ` b0) = 2 n
X
a
(b0  h(a a0) h(a)):
where (w) is the real-valued function equal to 1 if w is the zero vector and 0
otherwise. The prop ratio ranges between 0 and 1.
Dierential cryptanalysis attacks are possible if there are predictable dierence
propagations over all but a few rounds that have prop ratio signicantly larger
than 21 n, where n is the block length in the block ciphers [3]. To be resistant
against this attack, necessary condition is that there are no dierential trails with
predicted prop ratio higher than 21 n.
2. Extended Feistel Networks
Let (G;+) be an Abelian group, let f : G! G be a mapping and letA;B;C 2 G
are constants. The extended Feistel network FA;B;C : G
2 ! G2 created by f is
dened for every l; r 2 G by
FA;B;C(l; r) = (r +A; l +B + f(r + C)):
It is shown in [5, 6] that if f is a bijection, then FA;B;C is an orthomorphism
of the group (G2;+). Inversion of an orthomorphism is again an orthomorphism.
Even more, for the group (Zn2 ;n), any composition of two extended Feistel net-
works is an orthomorphism, too. We generalize the last statement for any Abelian
group by the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.1. Let (G;+) be an Abelian group, let f; g : G! G be bijections,
A;B;C;A0; B0; C 0 2 G and let FA;B;C ;HA0;B0;C0 : G2 ! G2 be extended Feistel
networks of the group (G2;+), created by f and g respectfully. Then the composite
function HA0;B0;C0  FA;B;C is an orthomorphism on (G2;+) too.
Proof. Let  = HA0;B0;C0 FA;B;C   I, where I is the identity mapping. Then, for
every l; r 2 G, we have
(l; r) = (B +A0 + f(r + C); A+B0 + g(l +B + C 0 + f(r + C))):
Dene the function 
 : G2 ! G2 by

(l; r) = (g 1(r  A B0)  l +A0   C 0; f 1(l  A0  B)  C):
It can be checked that 
  =  
 = I, i.e.,  and 
 =  1 are bijections. 
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2.1. Prop ratio tables of the extended Feistel networks over (Zn2 ;n).
In this subsection we consider extended Feistel networks of the Abelian groups
(Zn2 ;n) and their prop ratios. Our rst result is the following.
Proposition 2.2. Let FA;B;C : Z2n2 ! Z2n2 be an extended Feistel network of the
Abelian group (Z2n2 ;2n) created by a bijection f : Zn2 ! Zn2 . If the maximal prop
ratio of f is smaller than 1, then the extended Feistel network FA;B;C is uniquely
determined by the parameters A, B and C.
Proof. Let (A;B;C) 6= (A0; B0; C 0) and FA;B;C = FA0;B0;C0 . Then FA;B;C(l; r) =
(rn A; ln Bn f(rn C)) = (rn A0; ln B0n f(rn C 0)) = FA0;B0;C0(l; r);
for every l; r 2 Zn2 . Consequently, we have A = A0 and B n B0 = f(r n C) n
f(r n C 0) = K, where K is a constant. K 6= 0, since B = B0 implies C = C 0.
Then C n C 0 = R is also a nonzero constant. So, for every t, where t = r n C,
we have f(t)n f(tn R) = K.
The last equation means that we must have a nontrivial dierence propagation
for our starting bijection f , that propagates with probability 1. In other words, we
must have a nonzero input dierence R that propagates to the output dierence
K with probability 1, i.e., the maximal prop ratio of the starting bijection is 1. 
Theorem 2.1. Let f : Zk2 ! Zk2 be bijection such that Rp(a a f ` b) = 1 only for
a = b = 0, and let FA;B;C : Z2k2 ! Z2k2 be an extended Feistel network of the group
(Z2k2 ;2k), created by f . Then Rp(a0 a FA;B;C ` b0) = 1 if and only if a0 = (x; 0)
and b0 = (0; x) for some x 2 Zk2 .
Proof. Let b0 = (b01; b
0
2), a
0 = (a01; a
0
2), where b
0
1; b
0
2; a
0
1; a
0
2 2 Zk2 : Then we have:
Rp(a
0 a FA;B;C ` b0) = 1
, 2 2kPa (b0 2k FA;B;C(a2k a0)2k FA;B;C(a)) = 1
,Pa (b0 2k FA;B;C(a2k a0)2k FA;B;C(a)) = 22k
, (b0 2k FA;B;C(a2k a0)2k FA;B;C(a)) = 1 (8a 2 Z2k2 )
, b0 2k FA;B;C(a2k a0)2k FA;B;C(a) = 0 (8a 2 Z2k2 )
, (b01; b02)2k FA;B;C((a1; a2)2k (a01; a02))2k FA;B;C(a1; a2) = 0 (8(a1; a2) 2
Z2k2 )
, (b01; b02)2kFA;B;C(a1ka01; a2ka02)2kFA;B;C(a1; a2) = 0 (8(a1; a2) 2 Z2k2 )
, b01 k a2 k a02 k Ak a2 k A = 0 &
b02k a1k a01kBk f(a02k a2kC)k a1kBk f(a2kC) = 0 (8a1; a2 2 Zk2)
, b01 = a02 & b02 k a01 = f(a02 k a2 k C)k f(a2 k C) (8a2 2 Zk2).
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Let put a2 = t k C. Then for every t 2 Zk2 we will have b02 k a01 = f(a02 k
t) k f(t), i.e., Rp(a02 a f ` (b02 k a01)) = 1. It follows that b01 = a02 = 0 and
b02 = a
0
1: 
Corollary 2.1. The prop ratio table of an extended Feistel network Fa;b;c : Z2k2 !
Z2k2 of the group (Z2k2 ;2k), created by a bijection f : Zk2 ! Zk2 such that Rp(a a
f ` b) = 1 only for a = b = 0, has exactly 2k ones.
Theorem 2.2. Let f : Zk2 ! Zk2 be a bijection such that Rp(a a f ` b) = 1 only
for a = b = 0, and let FA;B;C : Z2k2 ! Z2k2 be an extended Feistel network of
the group (Z2k2 ;2k), created by f . Then Rp(a0 a F 2A;B;C ` b0) = 1 if and only if
a0 = b0 = (0; 0).
Proof. Let b0 = (b01; b
0
2), a
0 = (a01; a
0
2), where b
0
1; b
0
2; a
0
1; a
0
2 2 Zk2 : Then we have (by
avoiding some steps presented in the proof of Theorem 2.1):
Rp(a
0 a F 2A;B;C ` b0) = 1
, b0 2k F 2A;B;C(a2k a0)2k F 2A;B;C(a) = 0 (8a 2 Z2k2 )
, (b01; b02)2k F 2A;B;C((a1; a2)2k (a01; a02))2k F 2A;B;C(a1; a2) = 0 (8(a1; a2) 2
Z2k2 )
, (b01; b02)2kF 2A;B;C(a1ka01; a2ka02)2kF 2A;B;C(a1; a2) = 0 (8(a1; a2) 2 Z2k2 )
, b01ka1ka01kAkBkf(a02ka2kC)ka1kAkBkf(a2kC) = 0
& b02 k a2 k a02 k A k B k f(a1 k a01 k B k C k f(a2 k a02 k C)) k
a2 k Ak B k f(a1 k B k C k f(a2 k C)) = 0 (8a1; a2 2 Zk2)
, b01 k a01 = f(a02 k a2 k C)k f(a2 k C) &
b02 k a02 = f(a1 k a01 k B k C k f(a2 k a02 k C)) k f(a1 k B k C k
f(a2 k C)) (8a1; a2 2 Zk2).
Let put a2 = tkC. Then for every t 2 Zk2 we have b01ka01 = f(a02k t)kf(t),
which means Rp(a
0
2 a f ` (b01 k a01)) = 1. So, a02 = 0 and b01 = a01. Now, from the
second equality we have b02 = f(a1ka01kBkCkf(t))kf(a1kBkCkf(t)),
for every a1; t 2 Zk2 . Let put a1 = rk B k C k f(t). Then for every r 2 Zk2 we
have b02 = f(a
0
1 k r)k f(r), i.e., Rp(a01 a f ` b02) = 1. It follows that a02 = 0 and
b01 = a
0
1 = b
0
2 = 0. 
The previous theorems show that the maximal prop ratio of F 2A;B;C is smaller
than the maximal prop ratio of FA;B;C (which is equal to 1). Consequently, for
getting higher resistance again dierential cryptanalysis it should be used F 2A;B;C ,
and then the price is paid by smaller eciency.
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3. Quasigroups by extended Feistel networks over (Zn2 ;n)
Let (G;+) be an abelian group, let f : G ! G be a bijection and let FA;B;C
be an extended Feistel network created by f (FA;B;C is an orthomorphism of the
group (G2;+)). One can construct quasigroup (G2; ) by using Sade's diagonal
method [8] as a base [5, 6]. For all X;Y 2 G2, the quasigroup operation  is
dened by
X  Y = FA;B;C(X   Y ) + Y:
In the sequel we examine only Abelian group (Zn2 ;n). We give the shape of
prop ratio tables of the quasigroups produced by extended Feistel networks FA;B;C
and F 2A;B;C .
Theorem 3.1. Let QFA;B;C : Z4k2 ! Z2k2 be a quasigroup generated by the extended
Feistel network FA;B;C : Z2k2 ! Z2k2 of the group (Z2k2 ;2k), created by the bijection
f : Zk2 ! Zk2 such that Rp(a a f ` b) = 1 only for a = b = 0. We have
Rp(a
0 a QFA;B;C ` b0) = 1 if and only if a0 = (x; y; z; y) and b0 = (z; xk y k z);
for some x; y; z 2 Zk2 .
Proof. Let b0 = (b01; b
0
2), a
0 = (a01; a
0
2; a
0
3; a
0
4), where b
0
1; b
0
2; a
0
1; a
0
2; a
0
3; a
0
4 2 Zk2 : Then
we have (by avoiding some steps presented in the proof of Theorem 2.1):
Rp(a
0 a QFA;B;C ` b0) = 1
, b0 2k QFA;B;C (a4k a0)2k QFA;B;C (a) = 0 (8a 2 Z4k2 )
, (b01; b02)2k QFA;B;C (a1 k a01; a2 k a02; a3 k a03; a4 k a04)2k
QFA;B;C (a1; a2; a3; a4) = 0 (8a1; a2; a3; a4 2 Zk2)
, b01 k a2 k a02 k a3 k a03 k a4 k a04 k Ak a2 k a3 k a4 k A = 0 &
b02 k a1 k a01 k a3 k a03 k a4 k a04 k B k f(a02 k a2 k a04 k a4 k C)k
a1 k a3 k a4 k B k f(a2 k a4 k C) = 0 (8a1; a2; a3; a4 2 Zk2)
, b01 = a02 k a03 k a04 &
b02ka01ka03ka04 = f(a02ka2ka04ka4kC)k f(a2ka4kC) (8a2; a4 2
Zk2):
It follows that b01 = a
0
2 k a03 k a04 and, by putting a2 k a4 = t k C, we
obtain b02 k a01 k a03 k a04 = f(a02 k a04 k t) k f(t), for every t 2 Zk2 . This
means Rp((a
0
2 k a04) a f ` (b02 k a01 k a03 k a04)) = 1, implying a02 = a04 and
b02 = a
0
1 k a03 k a04. Hence, a0 = (x; y; z; y) and b0 = (z; x k y k z) for some
x; y; z 2 Zk2 . 
According to obtained prop ratio tables, quasigroups can be classied as:
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1. non-restricted quasigroups - when all nontrivial dierence propagations
are of prop ratio 1
2. weak restricted quasigroups - when at least one nontrivial dierence prop-
agation is of prop ratio 1 and at least one nontrivial dierence propagation
is of prop ratio smaller than 1
3. restricted quasigroups - when there is no nontrivial dierence propagations
of prop ratio 1.
Corollary 3.1. Extended Feistel network FA;B;C : Z2k2 ! Z2k2 of the group
(Z2k2 ;2k), created by the bijection f : Zk2 ! Zk2 such that Rp(a a f ` b) = 1
only for a = b = 0, produces weak restricted quasigroups and, even more, its prop
ratio table has 23k ones.
The interpretation of the last corollary tell us that for exactly 23k input dier-
ences we can predict the proper output dierence with probability 1. This is very
useful for dierential cryptanalysis, so we should not use this kind of quasigroups
standalone. As alternative, we have to use better quasigroups, or to use these
quasigroups in some quasigroup transformations.
Theorem 3.2. Let QF 2A;B;C : Z
4k
2 ! Z2k2 be a quasigroup generated by the extended
Feistel network FA;B;C : Z2k2 ! Z2k2 of the group (Z2k2 ;2k), created by the bijection
f : Zk2 ! Zk2 such that Rp(a a f ` b) = 1 only for a = b = 0. We have
Rp(a
0 a QF 2A;B;C ` b0) = 1 if and only if a0 = (x; y; x; y) and b0 = (x; y); for some
x; y 2 Zk2 .
Proof. Let b0 = (b01; b
0
2), a
0 = (a01; a
0
2; a
0
3; a
0
4), where b
0
1; b
0
2; a
0
1; a
0
2; a
0
3; a
0
4 2 Zk2 : Then
we have (by avoiding some steps presented in the proof of Theorem 2.1):
Rp(a
0 a QF 2A;B;C ` b0) = 1
, (b01; b02)2k QF 2A;B;C (a1 k a01; a2 k a02; a3 k a03; a4 k a04)2k
QF 2A;B;C (a1; a2; a3; a4) = 0 (8a1; a2; a3; a4 2 Zk2)
, b01 k a1 k a01 k A k B k f(a2 k a02 k a4 k a04 k C) k a1 k A k
Bk f(a2k a4k C) = 0 & b02k a2k a02k Ak Bk f(a1k a01k a3k
a03k Bk C k f(a2k a02k a4k a04k C))k a2k Ak Bk f(a1k a3k
B k C k f(a2 k a4 k C)) = 0 (8a1; a2; a3; a4 2 Zk2)
, b01 k a01 = f(a2 k a02 k a4 k a04 k C)k f(a2 k a4 k C) &
b02k a02 = f(a1k a01k a3k a03k Bk C k f(a2k a02k a4k a04k C))k
f(a1 k a3 k B k C k f(a2 k a4 k C)) (8a1; a2; a3; a4 2 Zk2)
Let put a2 k a4 = t k C. Then for every t 2 Zk2 we have b01 k a01 =
f(a02 k a04 k t) k f(t), which means Rp((a02 k a04) a f ` (b01 k a01)) = 1.
So, a02 = a
0
4 and b
0
1 = a
0
1. Now, from the second equality we have b
0
2 k a02 =
f(a1 k a01 k a3 k a03 k B k C k f(t))k f(a1 k a3 k B k C k f(t)) for
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every a1; a2; t 2 Zk2 : Putting a1 k a3 = r k B k C k f(t), we get b02 k a02 =
f(rk a01k a03)k f(r) for every t 2 Zk2 , i.e., Rp((a01k a03) a f ` (b02k a02)) = 1:
Then, altogether, we obtain a02 = a
0
4 and b
0
1 = a
0
1 and a
0
1 = a
0
3 and b
0
2 = a
0
2, which
means that a0 = (x; y; x; y) and b0 = (x; y) for some x; y 2 Zk2 . 
Corollary 3.2. Extended Feistel network F 2a;b;c : Z2k2 ! Z2k2 of the group (Z2k2 ;2k),
created by the bijection f : Zk2 ! Zk2 such that Rp(a a f ` b) = 1 only for
a = b = 0, produces weak restricted quasigroups and, even more, its prop ratio
table contains 22k ones.
Quasigroup produced by F 2a;b;c have better prop ratio tables than those pro-
duced by Fa;b;c, but still we have that 2
2k input dierences propagate to the proper
output dierence with probability 1. They are also not suitable for building cryp-
tographic primitives as they are, so some additional transformations should be
applied, if we choose to use them.
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